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SPEECH OF HON. JAMES BROOKS,

OF NEW YORK,

ON THE DEFICIENCY BILL.

In the House of Representatives, March 20, 1852, in the Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union on the Deficiency Bill—Mr. VENABLE, *of North Carolina, in the chair.*

Mr. BROOKS said:

Mr. CHAIRMAN: I had hoped that when this Deficiency bill came up, there would be a free, open, and legitimate discussion upon its merits. I had hoped that the honorable chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means would have availed himself of his right, under the rules, to address the committee for one hour, and that he would have given his exposition of the bill, so that some cue or clue could have been given to the discussion, and so that I might seem to be addressing myself in reply to something which might have been said upon this floor, rather than to things which, if not said here, are said elsewhere. But he was not able to avail himself of that privilege, and, therefore, I am placed in the somewhat embarrassing position of vindicating a bill which has not as yet been attacked upon the floor of this House, except by the incidental remarks of the honorable gentleman from Missouri, (Mr. HALL,) or some like incidental remarks, the other day, from an honorable gentleman from Tennessee.

EXECUTIVE ESTIMATES AND CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.

I propose, in the first place, to ask the attention of the House to the estimates of this Administration, and the necessities of the country that demanded them. It has been remarked, and truly, too, that the Administration is bound to make its estimates, and is responsible for them; but the House of Representatives is not less bound to vote those estimates, if they are founded upon a correct judgment of the necessities of the country, and that in voting them it endorses them, and is equally responsible, with the Administration, for them. This I say, frankly and freely, and I would have no misunderstanding about it. It will not do to say, "We must take and vote the estimates, and hold the Administration alone responsible for them. We can know nothing about them." It will not do, under our form of government, thus to make the legislative the mere register of the edicts of the Executive branch of the Government. It is our business, our duty, to study, to understand, to comprehend, the necessities of the country, as set forth in the estimates; to vote for them if they are right, and to refuse them if they are wrong. We are men, and we can as well understand them as the men who send them here. This is the constitutional theory of the appropriating power of this Government. To the Executive belongs the execution of the laws, but to Congress belongs the public purse. If Congress declines to make appropriations necessary to carry on the Government economically, and in good faith, it fails in one of its highest duties; and the Executive, if it has made its statements and its recommendations, is acquitted of all responsibility. It is well that we who are in a large minority here, with the responsibility of an Executive elsewhere, should have an understanding about this with the majority and at the start. Let there be no disguise about these things, then.

The purse, then, being in the hands of Congress, not a dollar can be taken from the treasury by the President except by the appropriation of the two Houses of Congress; and whatever appropriations are voted by Congress, Congress thus becomes responsible for and sanctions them. Congress has peculiar advantages over the Administration in voting upon its estimates, for under our peculiar financial system the fiscal year commences with the 1st of July, and Congress acts upon estimates often some months after the Executive submits them. For example, the estimates upon which we shall be called to act when the Civil and Diplomatic Appropriation bill comes up for consideration are for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1852, and ending with June 30, 1853, and were made, in part, by the War Department, in September or October last, and sent to the Executive in November last, being one year and seven, eight, or nine months ahead of their final expenditure, June 30, 1853. The Executive must have his estimates printed, and on our tables the very day we meet in December—estimates upon which we shall not probably act before July or August next. It is the duty of Congress, and it is its peculiar privilege, months after they are submitted, to scan these estimates, and to judge of them by the experience of a later period; but when Congress has adopted them Congress becomes responsible for them, as well as the Executive. Frankness and fair dealing demanded of me to say thus much here before we go further into the vote; and what I have said I hold to be true and legitimate doctrine.

WHAT ARE ESTIMATES.

Now, what are estimates? They are nothing but guesses at best. They are the judgment of men, founded upon the past history of this Government, and upon its past expenditure; of what is to happen hereafter, and what is to be the cost of it. Upon this past history, presuming the future will be as the past has been, they make their estimates of the future expenditure of the Government a year and seven or eight months before all those expenditures are to occur. Now, we stand on vantage ground some months ahead of the Executive in this matter. We know what the expenses of the Government have been since the time the estimates were made, or, at least, we can know if we desire. It is impossible for any Executive, unless he be gifted with extraordinary wisdom or some foresight divine, to know a year and seven months ahead what are to be all the actual expenses of the Government. If an Indian war arises, if trouble happens upon some distant ocean, if frontier difficulties are created, if there be any extraordinary increase of the cost of collecting revenue, or if there be any domestic troubles, it is impossible for the Executive to know what should be the exact estimates for the expenses of the Government a year and seven months ahead, or even for Congress to know, when, at a later period, it is making its appropriations. So that, under our peculiar financial system, there must always be deficiencies in some branches of expenditure, and surpluses in others, as there always have been deficiencies and surpluses, since this fiscal year has been substituted for the year of the calendar.

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DEFICIENCY BILLS NO NOVELTIES.

I have heard gentlemen speak of this Deficiency bill, which has appeared in this House, as of something new—unknown in Congress before, and as if belonging peculiarly to this Administration. If this idea has taken possession of the minds of any new member, he must be a new member indeed. From the time when the present financial system was established down to the present, these deficiency bills have appeared on the stage every year, and they will continue to appear hereafter, as long as the Government exists, or the fiscal year exists as it is now. I hold in my hand a tabular statement from the year 1844, exhibiting large deficiencies every year, under the administration of Mr. Polk, and I shall read it in part:

Additional estimates rendered by the Secretary of the Treasury, in connexion with the regular estimates at the commencement of the sessions of Congress.

For the fiscal year ending 30th June, 1844, (Mr. Spencer, Secretary:)		
Civil, miscellaneous, and foreign intercourse.....	$138,571 49	
Military department	150,441 47	
		$289,012 96
Congress appropriated.....		211,270 82
For the fiscal year ending 30th June, 1845, (Mr. Bibb, Secretary:)		
Civil, miscellaneous, and foreign intercourse.....	$176,203 63	
Military department	316,765 15	
		$492,968 78
Congress appropriated.....		443,864 05
For the fiscal year ending 30th June, 1846, (Mr. Walker, Secretary:)		
Civil, miscellaneous, and foreign intercourse.....	$1,009,764 21	
Military department	280,762 34	
		$1,290,526 55
Congress appropriated.....		1,700,914 99
For the fiscal year ending 30th June, 1847, (Mr. Walker, Secretary:)		
Civil, miscellaneous, and foreign intercourse.....	$666,700 72	
Military department..	4,793,000 00	
		$5,459,700 72
Congress appropriated.....		7,637,071 48
For the fiscal year ending 30th June, 1848, (Mr. Walker, Secretary:)		
Civil, miscellaneous, and foreign intercourse.....	$88,723 83	
Military department..	9,902,439 74	
Navy department.....	70,681 80	
		$10,061,844 57
Congress appropriated.....		13,315,666 88
For the fiscal year ending 30th June, 1849, (Mr. Walker, Secretary:)		
Civil, miscellaneous, and foreign intercourse, including Mexican indemnity.....		$3,744,903 69
Congress appropriated.....		3,885,193 81

I especially beg the attention of gentlemen on the other side to the deficiencies of 1847 and 1848, as in the last year a Whig Congress (Mr. Vinton chairman of the Ways and Means) made up for the deficiencies of Mr. Polk to the amount of over $13,200,000.

Mr. JONES, of Tennessee. I desire to ask the gentleman from New York if that was not during the Mexican war, when we had fifty thousand troops in the field?

Mr. BROOKS. Yes; but Congress, in declaring war with Mexico, authorized the raising of the troops, and provided the means of carrying it on; and it was the duty of the Executive to submit those estimates.

Now, it is very true that this was during the time of the Mexican war, and it was very probable that there would be deficiencies, doubtless larger deficiencies than would otherwise have been necessary; but it is also true that on the 13th of May, 1846, when the President was authorized to call into service the fifty thousand volunteers, he could, in the December following, have included in his estimates for the year ending June, 1848, the cost of maintaining them. It was the power of the Administration—the country then being involved in war—to face that war, and to estimate for enough to carry it on. It knew that, in order to conquer Mexico, it had to involve the country in a prodigious expenditure, and to bring in the field all the troops Congress authorized in May, 1846, and it was its duty, in submitting the estimates in December, 1846, for the year ending June, 1848, to fully, fairly, and fearlessly estimate what the cost of that job would be, certainly, just as much as it is the duty of this Administration now, a year and seven months ahead, to know what will be all, and the exact, expenditures of the Government in the now much larger fields of Oregon and California.

ESTIMATES DURING THE MEXICAN WAR.

But now the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. JONES) has chosen to introduce this justification of the Mexican war as a defence of erroneous estimates; I propose to follow him there—not to attack, but to demonstrate that the leading minds and leading men of his party are as fallible as other mortals in their guesses or estimates. I did not intend to introduce some facts which I have before me at all, but it now becomes proper to show, if war justifies larger deficiency bills than peace, or larger errors in estimates, the gentleman from Tennessee is well justified in interrupting me.

Mr. Polk, in his annual message, and Mr. Walker, in his Treasury report, December, 1846, stated that if the Mexican war continued to July 1, 1849, a loan of $23,000,000 would be needed to carry the Government forward, and that that would leave a surplus of $4,000,000 in the treasury. But Mr. Walker, in his report of December, 1847, asked—notwithstanding this surplus of $4,000,000 that was to be in the treasury—a loan of $18,500,000 additional, to meet the expenses of the Government the same year. The Ways and Means Committee reported his loan bill as asked for—that is, for $18,500,00. This Mr. Walker, the Secretary of the treasury then, gladdened the country with a letter to Congress, stating that he had made the fortunate discovery of an error, showing the treasury to have nearly seven millions of dollars more than stated in his annual report. The Committee of Ways and Means then reduced that loan of $18,500,000 to $12,000,000, to carry out that fortunate discovery. But, before the country was gladdened fully with this most satisfactory announcement, as early as January, 1848, the Secretary of the Treasury sent to the House another statement, saying that, when the first letter was sent in, he did not know that Mr. Marcy had called upon the Committee of Ways and Means for $4,000,000, to supply a deficiency, which was necessary in his (the War) Department, and therefore that the sixteen million loan would be necessary. This sum the Committee of Ways and Means reported, and Congress acted accordingly. Now, I do not mean to censure Mr. Walker, or Mr. Polk's administration, for this wild guessing, this blundering by millions, unless it be intended to convey the idea that they had the power of foreseeing all the actual expenditures of the war, exactly

what it would cost the country, and that it was their duty, therefore, to make estimates that would not admit of any possible deficiency; but I do mean to say, that no administration, throughout our whole history, has ever exhibited such a want of apprehension of its own means as that did—millions at a time—or such a want of comprehension of the great task it had undertaken, in conquering peace with Mexico. At one time it blundered upon seven millions of hitherto undiscovered treasure, but at another time the cruel Secretary of War had robbed it of four millions of its precious means and receipts. The war, it is clear, or rather the cost of it, had utterly bewildered Mr. Polk, Mr. Walker, Mr. Marcy, and all who, in Washington, had been carrying it on.

Equally erroneous were the estimates of Mr. Polk's administration for the expenditures for the fiscal year ending July 1, 1848. The Government set them down to be $45,781,784; but in only the first seven months of that fiscal year the estimates were changed and run up to $62,783,669. The Secretary of War then estimated his expenses for the fiscal year at $23,938,000, but in the session of 1847 and 1848 he asked for an additional expenditure of over $14,033,434—an addition of more than the yearly expenses of the Government during John Quincy Adams's administration!

I repeat that I do not intend to censure Mr. Polk, Mr. Walker, or Mr. Marcy; but I do intend to say, that if gentlemen suppose that this Administration can calculate or estimate better than did the last, they require more of us than they did themselves; and they pay us a compliment we ought to thank them for.

The Quartermaster General, Jesup, submitted to Mr. Marcy a statement of his deficiencies, upon the 4th of November, 1847, and there were then arrearages in his department, for which he estimated $7,500,000; and for clothing, camp and garrison equipage, $960,000 more; making in all nearly $8,460,000—a sum necessary for him as a deficiency. He estimated the expenditure for the next fiscal year, for his own, the quartermaster's department, to be over $19,291,200. This deficiency and this estimate were taken to Mr. Polk. He was frightened by the magnitude of them; and it is within the history of the Committee of Ways and Means—not the present committee—that Mr. Polk compelled General Jesup to cut down his arrearages from $7,500,000 to $5,000,000, and his clothing and camp equipage from $960,000 to $600,000; so that, instead of $8,460,000, only $5,600,000 were given; and the estimate of the quartermaster general for the year was cut down to $14,250,000. But on the 3d of February, soon afterwards—for these estimates were sent in December—Mr. Marcy writes to the Committee of Ways and Means that he wants, and must have, $360,000 for the clothing department, which brought back the sum necessary, then, to General Jesup's original estimate, $960,000. Now, I state these great facts in no carping spirit, nor with any love for crimination or recrimination, but to show that deficiencies must exist, as they have existed under an administration peculiarly beloved by the party now dominant in both Houses of Congress, and to ask that party to bear in mind that they always will exist unless the high officers of the Government are gifted with omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence, to control all the elements, and all the circumstances of war and of peace.

DEFICIENCIES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

But, Mr. Chairman, are our deficiences alone confined to the executive officers of the Government? I have in my hand now a letter from the Clerk of this House, directed to the Committee of Ways and Means, in which he asks for $100,000 deficiency in the estimates of the expenditures of this House, $75,000 of which are in the Deficiency bill which you now have under consideration. And if the House itself cannot judge of its own expenditures, does not know its own means, or spends more than it has estimateded, let us not hear one word from this House, or the majority in it, against another branch of the Government, which can spend not a cent but as it is appropriated. I will read the letter:

"HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Jan. 15, 1852.

"SIR: At the last session of Congress the sum of $209,971 was appropriated to meet the contingent expenses of the House of Representatives for the present fiscal year. Prior to the meeting of Congress there had been expended the sum of $144,500, and since that time there has been expended the sum of $33,320, leaving an unexpended balance of $32,250 to meet the contingent expenses of the House for the remainder of the fiscal year, ending the 30th day of June next.

"It has been reported to this office that the sum of $50,000 will be required to meet the expenses of printing alone; and I would, therefore, respectfully recommend that the sum of $100,000 be provided in the Deficiency bill to meet the contingent expenses of the House.

"I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"JNO. W. FORNEY.

"Hon. GEORGE S. HOUSTON,

"Chairman Committee of Ways and Means."

MILITARY EXPENDITURES.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I come to the expenses of the quartermaster's department, for which there are large appropriations in the Deficiency bill; but at the threshold I beg the House to remember, that every cent of deficiency here comes from cutting down the estimates last year $2,315,000, for the pruning-knife cut in there deep the last session of the last Congress, "in the dark, it was admitted in debate! Indeed, there is no deficiency in the quartermaster's department this year, save as it arises from the cutting down of his estimates last year, without rhyme or reason, as we see now. It is almost impossible, I will remark here, to comprehend the expenditures of this department, unless we are willing to give them a fair and full consideration. I must confess that, when the quartermaster general's estimates were submitted to the Committee of Ways and Means at the last Congress, of which committee I was, as now, a member, their magnitude struck my attention, and almost affrighted me. I could not comprehend them, and I sympathized, for the time being, with the indignant remarks which I heard from gentlemen upon all sides of the House respecting them. But this state of feeling arose from a want of proper study of the whole subject upon my part. I did not comprehend the growth and grandeur of this country. I did not appreciate the mighty fact, that since 1845, the time from which these expenditures had so much increased, that these United States have been more than doubled in their area and extent; and that whereas, before the Mexican war, we may be said to have had but one United States, one Republic; we have now, as it were, two United States, two Republics, and have added to us a territory twice as large as the old United States of America were in 1845.

FRONTIERS TO BE DEFENDED.

I hold in my hand a computation table of the area of the States, Territories, organized and unorganized, in the United States, which shows some interesting and important facts:

		Area in sq. miles.
Twenty-nine old States, (excluding Texas and California)		1,073,930
NEW TERRITORIES.		
California and New Mexico	526,078	
Texas	325,520	
Oregon	341,463	
		1,193,061
Northwest Territory, west of the Mississippi, including Minnesota, and bounded south by Iowa and the Platte river, and west by the Rocky mountains		745,584
Indian Territory, west of Missouri and Arkansas, and south of Platte river		248,851
Number of sq. miles in the United States		3,261,426

Showing these two new States, New Mexico and Oregon, only to have an area in square miles of 119,131 more than the twenty-nine old States of the Republic!

Thus we have, since 1845, more than doubled the area of territory that our army has to defend and protect, and doubled it, too, among savages, dwelling in wildernesses, or on mountains, and in fastnesses almost inaccessible to our troops. Now, under such a state of things, it is to be expected that in nearly all branches of this Government, as the country increases, its expenditures will increase in proportion to its territory—certainly its army expenditures in proportion to its territory, and more too—for that very increase of territory increases its difficulties and duties, and aggravates its outlays. And this, in part, is the great secret of the enormous expenditure in the quartermaster's department. The military posts in the United States in 1845 were only seventy-eight, the westernmost of which was Fort Washita, on the Red river; but in 1852 there are one hundred and eighteen military posts and arsenals. The following is the length of our frontier, in part, the Mexican frontier having to be protected under the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo:

Length of Mexican frontier.....1,700 miles.
Length of Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico.....3,500 "
Length of Pacific seacoast.....1,620 "

One of the most forcible arguments which General Jesup has made to this House, in his report, to show the necessary magnitude of his expenditures, is the colored map, which he has appended to the quartermaster's report, by which he not only shows the overland transportation his horses, mules, and wagons have to perform, but also that there are now four or six frontiers to the United States, whereas before there were only two or three. There is the frontier of the Pacific, then the Mexican and Oregon frontier, the inner frontier, this side of the Sierra Madre mountains, and the frontier beyond Missouri, full of savages and wild Indians; so that I may say, I think, without exaggeration, that, as exalted as the Roman empire was in its proudest day, far and wide as the imperial eagle went, and momentous and aggrandizing as were its achievements, equally alike difficulties, savages ten times more ferocious than Gaul or Briton, are now met by the soldiers and officers of this country, in the wide extent of posts which they have, extending from the Aroostook, in Maine, to Fort Wilkin, on Lake Superior, to Puget's Sound, in Oregon, and from the Rio Grande to the sources of the Red river, in Arkansas. It is necessary to comprehend this mighty fact of territorial extension in order to understand this great expenditure of the quartermaster's department. It is necessary to remember that the military posts are nearly doubled; that the territory has more than doubled; and also the other most essential fact, that in 1845 almost all the quartermaster's posts were accessible by steamboats, the one furthest off (Fort Scott) being within ninety miles from steamboat navigation, and that, too, in a region where supplies could be obtained in its neighborhood. Fort Washita, in the Chickasaw country, near the Red river, was the only outpost depending upon the interior for its supplies, and it was only eighty-six miles from the depôt where it was supplied. Pack and wagon have now to go hundreds and hundreds of miles. Supplies in some places have to go over a thousand miles by land. There is not in Oregon, New Mexico, Utah, California, or in the yet unsettled parts of Texas, even an ordinary turnpike road.

The cost of transportation from the depôts on the Gulf of Mexico to the ports in New Mexico, has been tested to be $22 a hundred for the supplies actually delivered in a sound state. No gentleman can have a proper idea of the magnitude of that quartermaster's department, unless he will carefully look over the reports of sub-officers, appended to the quartermaster's report. The prodigious operations of the quartermaster's department may be illustrated at the post of San Antonio, Texas, alone, and from this movement in Texas, the movements from Fort Leavenworth westward, may be guessed at also:

Statement showing the operations of the Quartermaster's Department at San Antonio, Texas, during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1851, under the direction of Brevet Major E. B. Babbitt, Assistant Quartermaster United States Army.

Sent from this post during the year..98 ox wagons.
Sent from this post during the year.752 mule "

Total .....850 "

of which 752 were Government mule wagons, and 98 contractors' ox wagons.

With the Government wagons were sent 59 principal teamsters and 780 teamsters.

The Government wagons were employed in transporting company and officers' baggage, subsistence, quartermasters', medical, ordnance, and other stores to the different military posts.

The contractors' wagons were employed in transporting public supplies (chiefly forage) to the different military posts.

By the contractors' wagons were forwarded 69,900 pounds of subsistence stores, 185,000 pounds of quartermasters' stores, and 185 pounds of ordnance stores.

By the Government wagons were forwarded about 170,700 pounds of baggage, 1,260,000 pounds of subsistence stores, 349,557 pounds of quartermasters' stores, 28,000 pounds of medical stores, and 122,650 pounds of ordnance stores.

Total number of pounds transported by wagons from this post, 2,185,992.

For this transportation were employed 946 men, 4,720 mules, 622 oxen, and 73 horses.

E. B. BABBITT,
Brevet Major and Assistant Quartermaster.

ASSISTANT QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE,
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS, June 30, 1851.

Now, looking at all these facts, I take pleasure in saying that, though I was affrighted at first by the quartermaster general's estimates, I do believe, and I say it, though that gentleman is opposed to me in politics, that Major General Jesup has discharged a most trying and difficult duty with great fidelity to the Government, with as careful a regard for the public interest as he would have done, or could have done, if he had been transacting, on a scale so large, his own private business, and that it has been the most embarrass-

ing, annoying, and trying duty ever imposed upon a quartermaster, at any time, or in any period, since the extension of the Roman government through the regions of Gaul and Briton, and over the Bosphorus of the East.

MILITARY POSTS AND INDIANS.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I propose to show the necessity for some of these posts which have been established. I first come to the State of Texas, where no small portion of our little army is stationed, and I propose to show that there is a necessity for the stationing of these forces there. The number of Indians stated to be in Texas, by our official and unofficial reports, much vary. The Camanches in some quarters are stated to be twenty thousand in number. The Lipans are estimated at five hundred. There are Wacoes, Keechies, Caddoes, Andaicos, Ionies, Shawanees, and other unnamed tribes. There are fierce and wild tribes, I am told, not even reported by our Indian Department, or not yet discovered by our Indian agents. The Indians in Texas, I am authorized to say by the honorable member from eastern Texas, (Mr. SCURRY,) who has been much in the Indian country, number, in the lowest estimate, twenty thousand, and they are Indians of a warlike and ferocious character. Our Indian relations with Texas are fearfully embarrassed by the fact that we have no land there "to reserve" for them, and that the Texan surveyors and chain-bearers march upon Indian territory, and take it without purchase or treaty. This brings the settlements of Texas into constant collision with the Indian tribes. The treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo imposes upon us the onerous, dangerous, and trying duty of not only protecting our own settlements from Indian invasion, but of protecting the Mexican frontier also, seventeen hundred miles long; and the expense of that is enormous. Besides this, upon the recommendation of the Governor of Texas, to be found in documents too long for me to read now, posts have been stationed from the Red river, about where it is crossed by the thirty-fourth parallel of latitude, along to El Paso—a distance of six or seven hundred miles—posts in the utter wilderness, and upon the prairie, and posts along the Rio Grande—eight or nine hundred miles more—making a frontier, in Texas alone, to be protected from the Indians, of fourteen or fifteen hundred miles. But, sir, besides—under the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo—being pledged to protect the Mexicans from nomadic Indians, there is also imposed upon this Government the yet higher duty of guarding the frontier of Mexico from Texan invasions. The scenes which have been lately transacted upon the Rio Grande—the filibuster scenes—have been a disgrace to this Government—not a disgrace to the Executive branch of this Government, but a disgrace to the Government that has not provided the Executive with sufficient means to guard that frontier from American invasion. We have stipulated, by the highest obligations, under the most solemn sanction, the preservation of the Mexican frontier from American invasion, and yet constantly there have been going there robbers and bandits—for that is the name of those persons, who have been faithless to their country, faithless to the American flag, reckless of treaties, and reckless of national and personal honor—persons better fitted by far to be Mexicans, than to be protected by the stars and stripes of the American flag. It is our duty—it is the duty especially of the northern people—to protect that frontier, and to stand by the treaty at all hazards. If that is not protected, and the American boundary is extended there beyond our present limits, then comes another question of annexation, the annexation of a Sierra Madre republic upon the southern side—about two or three States; and as an offset then, Canadian annexation upon the northern side, with States six or seven in number. General Persifer Smith, in a document which I have before me, urges the like establishment of posts along the Gila and eastward to the Rio Grande. Six hundred cavalry and four hundred infantry he demanded there, and he said there was an imperious necessity for them. The like necessity is urged for having posts established in New Mexico. The last news from Texas and New Mexico demonstrates that the frontiers of both Texas and about all of New Mexico are entirely unsafe at this moment for the want of sufficient protection from this Government. The news by the last mail is full of wars, full of the sacrifice of human life, in Texas especially, but in New Mexico as well as in Texas. There are estimated to be thirty thousand Indians in New Mexico, and ten thousand nomadic, wandering Indians, upon the borders of Texas and New Mexico. It is stated by Governor Calhoun—I vouch him for authority, though I cannot vouch for the fact—that amongst that wild, unsettled, and nomadic population of Indians—pueblos and half-civilized Mexicans—there are only three hundred real American citizens in New Mexico, unconnected with the army, (see despatch No. 58, to the Hon. Luke Lea.) Hence you see the necessity of armed force for protection. The service of officers and soldiers in New Mexico is worse than any officers or soldiers ever before have been exposed to, for it is constant war, without even the shade of glory—constant suffering, without any appreciation of it by their country. It can only be compared with the inglorious Indian wars in Florida; but worse than those even, for the soldier now is far from home, without comforts, without necessaries even, beyond the reach of civilization or sympathy. Utah, too, is in a dangerous condition. There are Indians there interrupting the lines of emigration to Oregon, endangering the life of every citizen who travels there; and hence the necessity for protection. Mr. Holeman, an Indian agent, writes from Fort Laramie, Sept. 21, 1851:

"On my route to Utah, I passed many trains of emigrants—some for Oregon, some for California, but mostly for Utah. I found many of them in great distress, from depredations and robberies committed by the Indians; some were robbed of all their provisions, and even of the clothing on their back; many had their stock stolen, &c."

* * * * *

"I find much excitement among the Indians, in consequence of the whites settling and taking possession of their country, driving off and killing their game, and in some instances driving off the Indians themselves.

"The great complaint on this score is against the Mormons; they seem not to be satisfied with taking possession of the valley of the Great Salt Lake, but are making arrangements to settle other, and principally the rich, valleys and best lands in the Territory. This creates much dissatisfaction among the Indians; excites them to acts of revenge; they attack emigrants, plunder, and commit murder, whenever they find a party weak enough to enable them to do so; thereby making the innocent suffer for injuries done by others."

And here we have the peculiar people of Utah. Who knows what they are doing, or intend to do? Who can tell? Who can say whether they recognise allegiance to this country or some other country? Who can say whether the laws can be enforced there without a regiment or two to execute them? Now, as to Oregon—and I trust the honorable delegate from Oregon is in his seat, for I am

about to use his name as authority—I have a statement before me, vouched for by him as coming from a Mr. Newell, an intelligent old mountaineer, that there are sixty-five tribes of Indians in Oregon, having the most outlandish names—names I never heard of until I looked into the report he made. These tribes have the euphonious names of Spokans, Oukenegans, Clickitats, Shoqualamicks, &c.—names, I will venture to say, that were never heard of by the great mass of the people of our country. The number of tribes there are sixty-five, thirty tribes north of the Columbia river, and thirty-five tribes south; and the number of Indians which the delegate from Oregon (General LANE) estimates to be in Oregon are over thirty thousand. This session of Congress, the honorable delegate has strenuously demanded of Congress more protection, and he has censured the Government for even removing the rifle regiment to Texas.

There is California, too, upon our hands—California abounding in wealth, and not less abounding in expenditures; the one so well equally balancing the other, that it often requires nice arithmetical calculation to tell whether the country is gaining or losing, for the present, by the accession. The late Governor of California estimated the number of Indians—and called upon the War Department, under that estimate, for protection—to be over one hundred thousand. I have no doubt that the number was exaggerated; but I stand, for the present, upon that estimate. Governor McDougal writes, March 1, 1851, to the President of the United States:

"The valley of Los Angeles, of the San Joaquin, of the tributaries of the Sacramento, and the country around the main sources of that river, and the northern coast, contain an Indian force estimated at not less than one hundred thousand warriors, all animated by a spirit of bitter hostility, and whom pacific and forbearing policy encourages into renewed acts of outrage.

"Rendered bold by impunity, and encouraged by success, they are now everywhere rising in arms, and every day brings the report of some new outbreak."

* * * * * *

"Protection by our people is regarded as their constitutional right; it is about the only benefit they can derive from their relation to the Federal Government, while their burdens are not light ones."

COST OF FLORIDA WAR.

Now, Mr. Chairman, to stop all party clamor, I have compiled for my use an estimate of the expenses of the Florida war, to be compared, if necessary, with the expense of these numerous Indian wars now on our hands. But, before I make the comparison, I wish to remark, that if any man fancies this country is now in peace with the savage tribes around us, he but indulges in fancy. It is a state of actual war wherever you go, amongst the western savages beyond the settlements. The savage is fighting now not only for life, for existence, but for a home—and for his last home, too. He knows, as well as you do, that you have shut him out from the Pacific, and that he can go West no further. He knows, as well as you do, that his march is no longer eastward, but that he is in the heart of your territory now, with the columns of emigration pressing him upon every side. He stands not ready, as heretofore, to face you with formidable numbers in battle array; but, with the tomahawk, he cunningly waits for an opportunity to scalp you and your children, who may be emigrating to California or Oregon, or with the arrow to pierce you, or in stealth to creep upon and plunder you. War, war exists with the savage on every side. There were in Florida, during the Florida war, it is believed, not over 1,100 Indians, with a few negroes.

The appropriations for the army and for the suppression of Indian hostilities, &c., including all military operations, were:

In 1836	$8,111,950
In 1837	9,308,521
In 1838	10,007,546
Total	$27,428,017

Besides these, there were subsequent appropriations for arrears, and for paying the claims of States for services of militia, &c.

The regular force in service in the United States during that period averaged 7,500; the total militia force was about 36,000, averaging three months service—that is, equal to 9,000 men for the year, or 3,000 for three years; that force added to the army would give about 10,500 men, at an average expense of $9,100,000, or $860 per man. The least possible estimates that can be made of the cost of the Florida war was $11,000,000 or $13,000,0000.

The average force of the army for the three years succeeding the war with Mexico has been ten thousand five hundred, with a few hundred volunteers. The estimates have been under $7,000,000 per annum, and the appropriation still less. The actual expenses probably have not exceeded $8,500,000 per annum, or not $800 per man. Now, I know there was extravagance in the Florida war. I know volunteers were called out when they were not needed. I know firewood was brought from the levee of New Orleans to Florida, where firewood abounded. I challenge no comparison with such expenditures, justified even by a Democratic administration and a Democratic Congress; but what I do challenge is a comparison of the geographical position of Florida, in the heart of our settled country almost, accessible by sea and by steam, with comparatively little or no land transportation within the reach of the great markets of New Orleans and the northern cities—with the geographical position of New Mexico, of Utah, of Texas, the Upper Rio Grande, and on the Texas northern boundary—with the costly, golden prices of Oregon and California, remote from cities and abounding in immigrating colonists, enhancing by their numbers the value of every thing enormously. The naval expenses of the Florida war, the cost of revenue cutters in service there—all such charges I throw out of account, for the challenged point of comparison is accessibility by water and steam, and the expenses of land transportation. Now, we have overland wagon routes across a whole continent, from Fort Leavenworth in Missouri, to Puget's Sound on the Pacific ocean. The rifle regiment made the march across a continent, and endured more, and suffered more, and cost more, than if they had been in the campaign in Mexico. Troops, flying squadrons of dragoons, are all the while scouring and overrunning what I may call the innermost part of the country. The service is with them all a service of war; and yet they exhibit no such expenditures as these incurred here at home in subduing only eleven hundred Indians in Florida.

QUARTERMASTER'S EXPENDITURES.

The expenses of transportation, of forage, and in fact every thing in California, are often ten times greater than in other parts of this country; but California is not less a part of the United States, and it is not less our duty to protect her people, in each and every quarter, from the Indians, as

much as if these Indians were in Tennessee, New York, or Alabama. I have before me a paper, too long to read, containing all the expenditures of the quartermaster's department for a large number of years. Those expenditures have been larger for a long time than they have shown upon their face, in the estimates, especially during, and in consequence of, the Mexican war, from a system too complicated for me here to explain, because I have not time to do so. But the actual expenditures of the quartermaster's department, for the year ending 30th June, 1849—the closing year of Mr. Mr. Polk's administration—were $6,090,976. Mr. Polk estimated (peace estimates, June 30, 1848) $4,430,000. Congress (August 18, 1848) appropriated only $2,940,000. The next year, December, 1848, the estimates made by Mr. Polk were for only $2,000,000; cut down largely by Mr. Polk again, from General Jesup's estimate, as I am prepared to substantiate, and as I fear, because there was an incoming Whig administration. The estimates, December, 1848, were for $2,000,000, and the expenditures were $5,338,969. Such are the legacies of debt in the quartermaster's department, which have been left us by a preceding administration. The following table of actual expenditures in the quartermaster's department will explain itself:

	Expenditure.
Year ending June 30, 1849	$6,090,976
" " June 30, 1850	5,338,969
" " June 30, 1851	4,892,927
" " June 30, 1852 (estimated)	4,379,000
" " June 30, 1853 (estimated)	3,900,000

Congress last year cut from the estimate of June 30, 1852, $2,315,000. The following table will explain the estimates of last year cut off, and what is new in the bill for deficiencies:

Heads of appropriations.	Am'te cut off by Congress last year.	Amounts estimat'd this year for deficiency.	In the Deficiency bill.
For reg'lar supplies	$630,000	$917,460	$795,000
For incidental expenses	225,000	-	-
For purchase of horses	60,000	40,000	40,000
For barracks, quarters, &c.	400,000	219,000	219,000
For trans'n of troops, &c.	1,000,000	890,000	890,000
	$2,315,000	$2,066,460	$1,944,000

The only complaint I make, Mr. Chairman, against General Jesup is, that he has not had the courage at all times to face the Executive and Congress, and tell them both of all these expenditures—what and how indispensably necessary they were. He should have let the country understand from the start what was the cost of the Mexican war, and the cost of the Mexican acquisitions. And though he has been a soldier, who has faced battle, yet in the Executive Chamber I fear that he has not had the courage to face Mr. Polk and his estimates at every hazard.

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE QUARTERMASTER GENERAL.

I know it is said that the quartermaster is not responsible for all his expenditures. I understand that argument, and all the force there is in it. Here is a book containing the regulations of the quartermaster's department. It is the Army Regulations; and it appears from this that he has a complete *administrative* control of all the officers belonging to his department; that it is his duty "to provide quarters, hospitals, and transportation for all military stores, provisions, camp and garrison equipage;" "good and sufficient storehouses for all military stores;" "to purchase all fuel, forage, straw, and stationery;" "to purchase all horses, oxen, mules, and harness, and all wagons, carts, and boats;" "to purchase dragoon and artillery horses;" "saddles, bridles, and other necessary equipments;" "to provide materials, and direct and superintend the constructing and repairing of quarters, barracks, hospitals, storehouses, stables, and other necessary and authorized buildings for the army, and the security of public property," (Art. 77-927.) I quote the following from the Army Regulations:

933. "It shall be the duty of the quartermaster general to make himself acquainted with the frontiers, both maritime and interior; and with all the principal avenues leading to the contiguous Indian and foreign territories; with the military resources of the country; and the means and facilities of transportation, particularly of the districts on the frontiers; with the most eligible points for concentrating troops and collecting supplies, whether in relation to offensive or defensive operations; with the relative expense of concentrating at particular positions, and the advantages of those positions; and he shall be prepared at all times to give detailed information on those subjects, when required to do so, either by the Secretary of War or the General-in-Chief."

934. "He shall, under the orders, or with the approbation, of the Secretary of War, or the General-in-Chief, designate the routes of communication between the different posts and armies; the course of military roads, and the sites for permanent and temporary depôts of provisions and military stores."

938. "He shall prepare all the estimates of the funds and supplies required for the service of his department, and he shall prepare and submit, for the sanction of the Secretary of War, plans for barracks, quarters, and other improvements, and cause the plans, when approved, to be carried into effect, as far as the means provided by Congress shall enable him."

I might go on through the 1,078 sections of the quartermaster's duties to show his responsibilities. The most important branch of the army is his. Without him nothing of importance can be done; and, indeed, every thing depends upon him. I know there will be an attempt to evade for him, and to avoid for him, these responsibilities, because the Administration cannot be struck at without striking him down first; and in striking him down, an army officer, not of our political faith, will be struck at, but there he is; these are his duties, these are his responsibilities; and no petty quibbling, nor artful dodging, can relieve him; and I am sure he himself does not wish to be relieved from any duty the army regulations impose upon him.

EXPENSES INCREASED BY CONGRESS, 1850.

It must be borne in mind that Congress has largely increased the army since the peace establishment of 1845. It has created the costly regiment of mounted riflemen. In 1845, January 1st, the organization of the army was 8,654; but January 1, 1852, it was 12,311. By the act of June 17, 1850, all companies serving at the several military posts on the western frontier, and at remote and distant stations, are entitled to seventy privates each, and at other stations the number of privates per company is:

In the dragoons	55	Additional, 24
In mounted rifles	64	" 10
In artillery	42	" 32
In light artillery	64	" 10
In infantry	42	" 32

At the remote stations referred to in the law, there are now stationed, of

Dragoons	18	companies.
Mounted rifles	10	"
Artillery	11	"
Infantry	59	"
Total	98	companies.

MOUNTED FORCE.

Organization in 1852,	2,632	Strength, 1,960
Organization in 1845,	1,298	" 1,108
Increase	1,334	852

The additional cost of supporting a regiment of cavalry over and above that of a regiment of infantry is as follows:

On the frontier of Missouri or Iowa	$139,827
In Texas	213,331
In New Mexico	343,548

The act of June 17, 1842, also raised the bounty on enlistments, in lieu of transportation, to sums ranging from $23 to $142.

Examination of such facts as these will show why and how there have been increased the expenses of the army.

THE EXPENSES OF THE GOVERNMENT.

I hasten on from this dry and tedious detail, but I cannot flatter you, however, that I shall present any detailed statement less dry. It has been said that the expenditures of this Government have run up to $50,000,000; and I am asked, I think I hear, "How is it that you Whigs have thus run up the aggregate expenses of the Government, and that now, when you got along under John Quincy Adams with only some $12,000,000, you estimate some $42,892,299 to be necessary for the fiscal year ending July 1, 1853?" Indeed, an honorable member from Indiana has already entered into this sort of fiscal criticism, and I am prepared to answer him, and all others with him.

In the first place, I ask his attention to the legacy of debts and the legacy of appropriations bequeathed to us by the Mexican war. War is a costly as well as a bloody luxury, and it is always well to comprehend its cost as well as its glories.

LEGACY OF DEBT.

The Mexican war left upon the country an immediate national debt of about $80,000,000, exclusive of pensions, bounty lands, and the annual additional, but incalculable, cost of governing and keeping what we won from, or bought of, Mexico. The ten million Texas indemnity bill may be added to that, for all that is yet to be paid, with interest for fourteen years. The Mexican war bounty lands absorbed 6,036,960 acres of the public lands, worth, at $1 25 per acre, $7,546,200; and the bounty land bill of September 28, 1850, some, if not most of which, in some form or other, is for soldiers serving in consequence of the Mexican war, absorbs, it is estimated, 48,000,000 acres more, worth $60,000,000. (See Treasury report, 1850, statement K.) We have just passed another bounty land law, the number of acres to be absorbed by which I have no means of calculating.

The pensions, under act of 1848, paid to 30th June, 1850, were	$1,198,141
Pensions under act of 1848, estimated for 1851 and 1852, were	1,525,000

(See statements by James E. Heath, Treasury Report, 1850—statement M, No. 1, and M, No 2.)

The expenses entailed upon the country in consequence of the Mexican war and its acquisitions, can be understood only by a relative comparison of what were the expenditures of this Government before and after the war. Accurate tables have been prepared—the curious in such matters will find them in the Treasury Report of 1850—showing (see statement I:)

The actual and estimated expenditures for the seven years ending the 30th June, 1852, to amount to	$294,807,407
The expenditures for the year ending 30th June, 1845—the year immediately preceding the war—having been $21,380,049, the aggregate expenditures for the seven succeeding years upon that basis would have amounted to	149,660,345
Showing an excess over the peace establishment of 1845 of	$145,147,062

The Secretary of the Treasury, in his report of 1850, estimates, on most excellent data, the expenditures and liabilities chargeable directly to the Mexican war and the acquisitions consequent upon the treaty of peace, to be $217,175,577. The details of this estimate are too long to be quoted, but it can be seen in part in such items as pensions above stated, and

Instalments and interest under twelfth article of treaty with Mexico	$16,388,396
Payment of liquidated claims against Mexico, per act 29th July, 1848	2,089,578
Interest on war debt to 30th June, 1852	13,387,544
Interest on war debt from 30th June, 1852, to maturity	41,173,493
Texas boundary stock	10,000,000
Interest for fourteen years, 5 per cent	7,000,000
Mexican claims, per treaty, (paid)	3,250,000
Survey boundary line between United States and Mexico	335,000
Survey of the coast of California	200,000
Lighthouses, docks, custom-houses, hospitals, &c., in California, (small estimate)	640,000
The excess of expenditures of War Department in the maintenance of troops, &c, in the new Territories, is estimated now (every year) at	4,556,709

DEBT PAID BY THE ADMINISTRATION.

This Administration has had to meet such obligations as these, and many more, the bequests of the preceding administration. Indeed, one of its chief duties has been to pay the debts of its predecessors.

The public registered debt on the 30th of November, 1850, was	$64,228,238
The public debt 20th November, 1851, was	62,560,395

Since the Whigs came into power, March 4, 1849, they have freed the country from an amount of public debt, as follows:

Stock of the loan of 1843—act of 3d March, 1843	$231,300 00
Stock of the loan of 1846—act of 22d July, 1846	9 74
Stock of the loan of 1847—act of 28th January, 1847	1,883,200 00
Mexican indemnity—act of 10th August, 1846	303,573 92
Bounty land scrip—act 11th February, 1847	232,875 00

Old funded and unfunded debt—act 4th August, 1790, and 12th June, 1798	7,814 87
Awards under the fifteenth article of the treaty with Mexico, for which the issue of stock was authorized, but which were paid in cash	3,006,275 51
Payments under twelfth article of the treaty with Mexico, (by instalments)	11,258,140 31
	$16,923,189 35

Nearly seventeen millions of dollars!

DEBENTURES, DRAWBACKS, NO EXPENDITURES.

To understand the comparative expenditures of this Government, it will be necessary to bear in mind the changes that the laws have made in the mode of registering the expenditures from year to year. Prior to June 30, 1849, the expenses of collecting the revenue from customs, lands, debenture bonds, refunding duties, &c., were never registered in the annual expenditures, but the cost of collecting the revenue alone for the first time, of late registered as a part of the expenses of Government, is over two millions a year; and these two millions appear now, under this Administration, as a part of the annual expenditures. The same remark may be made of other items, that go to swell up the $48,005,878, which the Register of the Treasury reports as making the annual expenditures for the year ending June 30, 1851. The new system is—and it is a wise system—to record all expenditures, all out-goings, such as the following, and Whigs see it done with pleasure:

Repayment of duties on sugar and molasses, illegally exacted by collectors	$439,588
Payment of debentures, drawbacks, bounties, and allowances	794,639
Repayment to importers of excess of deposits for unascertained duties	896,024
Debentures and other charges, (customs)	72,623
Expenses of collecting revenue from customs prior to 1st January, 1850	1,888,471
Payment of public debt and interest	4,217,986

These are all items that have not hitherto figured in the annual expenditures of the Government, and these amount in all to $8,309,331. Indeed, the estimates of the Secretary of the Treasury, for the year ending June 30, 1852, were $33,667,489. The estimates for the year ending June 30, 1853, are $29,257,533; while the expenditures as appropriated by the last Congress, and the Congresses preceding, were $48,005,878, being over-estimates for year ending 1852, $14,338,339.

COST OF MEXICAN ACQUISITIONS.

The Secretary of the Treasury states, in part, of the appropriations required by our new Territories, and in the fulfilment of our obligations consequent upon the acquisition, the following items:

Survey of the boundary line between the United States and New Mexico	$120,000 00
Survey of the west coast	150,000 00
Dry dock in California	360,000 00
Mileage and per diem of Senators and Representatives from California, Utah, and New Mexico	26,462 40
Territorial governments of Utah and New Mexico	61,400 00
Judicial expenses, including marshals	77,200 00
Expenses for commission for settling land titles in California	50,000 00
Expenses for surveys in California	18,500 00
Expenses for surveys and sales of public lands in California	239,075 00
Pensions under the acts of 1848	431,240 00
Expenses of Post Office Department	638,250 00
Excess of expenditures of War Department in the maintenance of troops, &c., in the new Territories	4,556,709 75
Interest on so much of the debt contracted in consequence of and during the late war	2,820,242 97
Making an aggregate of	$9,549,080 12

These are all expenditures falling upon the Administration, unknown to preceding ones, and in consequence of our Mexican acquisitions!

Now, nearly all the army of the United States is in Texas, or in our Mexican acquisitions, and much of our navy is employed on the Pacific coast, where the cost of every thing is enormous, in consequence of the abundance of gold. Land surveys are to be begun, land titles to be settled, revenue cutters to be kept up; in short, a new and great country there is to be colonized and provided for, with coast surveys, lights, fortifications, docks, mailships, and harbor improvements; and where there exists now little or nothing, every thing is to be brought up to an equality with the old States. There is no calculating for future expenditures there. Already we have on our table a bill restoring to California what is called her "civil fund"—a fund expended even before her organization as a State—amounting at present to about half a million in the bill that has come down from the Senate, but as a claim upon us amounting to $1,300,000 in all.

We must not, however, now shrink from the responsibilities war has brought upon us, and that we have assumed. After we have annexed Texas, and stretched out our arms over the Rocky mountains to the Pacific, we cannot turn back from what we have undertaken. All of these lands are now our country, under our Government, and we must protect and provide for them. There is no ambition so mean as that which covets the possessions of others, but grudges the cost of governing them.

THE REVENUE AND TARIFF OF 1846.

The expenses of the administration of the Government now being necessarily so large, I shall be asked, no doubt, "How is it that you Whigs, who predicted the tariff of 1846 would not yield revenue enough to carry on the Government then, now find it yields enough not only to maintain the expenses of what you call a double United States, but to leave a surplus of some millions in the treasury?" It is a fair question, and I will not shirk it; I will meet it face to face. There was a time when it would have appalled me, but only because I was ignorant of the history, the written and unwritten history, of the tariff of 1846. It may well have appalled a Whig to know why it was, when such sound men as George Evans and others predicted in the Senate and in this House that the tariff of 1846 would not yield enough to carry on the Government, that it should really yield enough, and more too. I propose to solve this apparent contradiction of prophecy and experience, and to the solution I beg the careful attention of the House.

When George Evans and others, in 1846, made these predictions, they were based upon the tariff bill of July 30, 1846; which cut up all importations into schedules, from letter "A to letter I," and then affixed to them horizontal, universal *ad valorem*, from one hundred per cent. down to five per cent., and "duty free." The novelty of such a Procrustean tariff bed attracted their attention. No other nation under the sun, civilized or savage, had ever been thus before, to say the least, so

original. Procrustes struck out the idea of a bed, upon which short men were to be stretched out to fit it, and long men to be chopped off to fit it; but a universal *ad valorem* tariff bed was something altogether new in political economy. So many cents duty on a gallon of brandy or wine, was a duty, a specific duty, everybody could comprehend; but "one hundred per centum *ad valorem*" ("schedule A") on brandy and other spirits distilled from grain—such schedules, from "A" to "I", confounded them. Brandy, wines, and a thousand other like things, susceptible of accurate specific admeasurement, why, they asked, *ad valorem* then? It was a premium for bad brandy, and half-poisoned wine, everybody saw; for, the cheaper was the nominal cost abroad, the less was the duty at home, unless a wrongful or fraudulent system of invoices was introduced, by which all such things were rated abroad, below what they were worth. What appraisers, they asked, too, can tell what wine is worth, (*ad valorem,*) unless they have been experienced, practiced wine-bibbers from their youth up? Even they, too, might be deceived, for when liquors come over sea, especially high-priced wines, they often come, as it is termed technically, "sick;" that is, muddy and roiled; apparently of an *ad valorem* not quarter price. Universal geniuses, they said, were wanted under such universal *ad valorems* for appraisers—the universal genius that can turn from arrack, or kirchenwasser, to ginger-roots and gelatine, or from bananas to beeswax, with an instant, thorough comprehension of every thing. Their great objection, however, and their apprehensions, came from the serious radical defects in the principle of an universal *ad valorem* system, and from the numerous frauds that must constantly be arising, and the constant conflicts the Treasury must always be in with merchants, American and foreign. Their leading objection was, that it based the American tariff upon European *ad valorems*—that is, made our American tariff in Europe; and that when it thus surrendered American to European interests, there was no fixed system, no proper rule, no real law prescribed for estimating these values even in Europe. It is obvious that an American tariff, which surrenders the whole American system of home valuations to foreign valuations, is a foreign tariff, levied at American ports. If the value of cottons, or woollens, or iron-wrought articles, is fixed in Europe, and upon that value, thus fixed there, a duty is levied and collected in New York, two things are obvious—first, that such a tariff is a foreign levied tariff, even though collected under American law; and, second, that the value, the *ad valorem*, depends upon foreign estimation, foreign caprice, or, it may be, foreign fraud or perjury. The tariff law of July, 1846, was open to all these objections; and I shall show, on Democratic, anti-tariff authority, too, has been admitted so to be.

The force of these objections struck Mr. Secretary Walker and the Committee of Ways and Means in 1846, and they did not believe that as the tariff stood then, under the act of July, with the whole *ad valorem* system then subject to foreign caprice, that they could collect duty enough under it to carry on the Government. I make these remarks, and draw these inferences, because in that very extraordinary place for making tariffs, the Civil and Diplomatic bill, approved August 10, 1846, there was inserted—may I not say, smuggled; for who then probably foresaw its full effect?—this very significant and pregnant item:

"That in *appraising* all goods at any port in the United States, heretofore subjected to specific duties, but upon which *ad valorem* duties are imposed by the act of July 30, 1846, entitled 'An act reducing the duty on imports, and for other purposes,' *reference* shall be had to values and invoices of similar goods *imported during that fiscal year*, under such general and uniform regulations, *for the prevention of fraud or under-valuation, as shall be prescribed by the* Secretary of the Treasury."

I call this item in this civil and diplomatic bill a significant and pregnant item, for it not only refers to, and to some extent revives, the tariff of 1842, (certainly as to values and invoices,) but what is more, it vested in Mr. Walker, then Secretary of the Treasury, the power of prescription of such general and uniform regulations (as to *ad valorems*) as he might think proper. Mr. Walker instantly availed himself of this plenipotent power; and, in order to levy as high duties as possible on high *ad valorems*, he not only revived what he could of the tariff of 1842, but he went a great deal further, even into what the Supreme Court of the United States subsequently decided to be contrary to law. He meant to baulk the prediction of Whig prophets, law or no law; and he did do it in defiance of law.

ILLEGAL TREASURY CIRCULARS.

There are, Mr. Chairman—you as a lawyer know—two kinds of law, written and unwritten, the statute law, such as that of July 30, and August 10, 1846, and the common law, the law of "prescription." The common law of the Treasury Department is a Treasury code, called Treasury circulars; and, as the tariff of 1846 was going into operation, Mr. Walker began to scatter them as thick as the leaves of Vallambrosa. The Treasury code, which issues its rescripts in Treasury circulars, has power more plenipotent for the time being than any statute law. The appraisers, who inspect and examine imports, and judge of their values, hold their offices from the Treasury, and whatever the Treasury prescribes, with them is law. Hence, when Mr. Walker had, in the Civil and Diplomatic bill, or thought he had, the power of "prescription" as to the *ad valorems*, and exercised that power without restraint, he became the law. This power, I shall show you, was exercised with a high hand from December, 1846, up to January, 1851.

Mr. Walker himself began the first exercise of the power of prescription in a somewhat famous Treasury circular, November 25, 1846. He quotes, as if with exultation, the hitherto hidden item in the civil and diplomatic bill. He dictates, also, the modes and manner of appraisements, thus:

"The principle upon which the appraisement is based is this: That the actual value of articles on shipboard at the last place of shipment to the United States, including all preceding expenses, duties, costs, charges, and transportation, is the foreign value upon which the duty is to be assessed. The cost and charges that are to be embraced in fixing the valuation over and above the value of the article at the place of growth, production, or manufacture, are:

"1st. The transportation, shipment, and terms—shipment, with all the expenses included, from the place of growth, production, or manufacture, whether by land or water carriage, to the vessel in which a shipment is made, to the United States. Included in these estimates is the value of the sack, package, box, crate, hogshead, barrel, bale, cask, can, and covering of all kinds, bottles, jars, vessels, and demijohns.

"2d. Commission, at the usual rate, but in no case less than two and a half per cent., and when there is a distinct brokerage, that to be added.

"3d. Export duties, including such duties at all places from the place of growth, production, or

manufacture, to the last place of shipment to the United States.

"4th. Cost of placing cargoes on board ship, including drayage, labor, bill of lading, lighterage, town duties, and shipping charges, dock and wharf dues, and all charges to place the article upon shipboard.

"Discounts are never to be allowed in any case, except on articles where it has been the uniform and established usage heretofore, and never more than the actual discount, positively known to the appraiser.

"The freight from the last place of shipment to the United States is not to be included in the valuation; and insurance is also excluded by law."

Here the Treasury circular assumed that the principle on which the appraisement is based is the actual value on board ship at the place of shipment, including *all* preceding expenses, duties, costs, charges, and transportation. The difference was essential to the revenue of the United States; you will see whether the duty was levied on the actual value at the place of purchase or procurement, or at the place of shipment. Silks, or velvets, purchased at Lyons, in France, or watches or jewelry purchased at Geneva, had one value; but when transported for shipment to Havre, subject, it may be, to city duties, or duties international, to costs and charges also of transportation, that original value was essentially enhanced. Goods purchased of the manufacturer in the interior of Germany, or at forced auction sales, had one invoice—one value at the time of purchase but at the time and place of shipment, from a great rise in value, or from some other cause, the invoice or *ad valorem* would be altogether a different one from what it was at the start. Here, then, in one Treasury rescript, Mr. Walker made a tariff of his own, and his appraisers in New York, Boston, and in every custom-house, of course obeyed.

This Treasury rescript was followed by another, July 6, 1847, more imperial by far than its predecessor. This circular starts with stating that the twenty-third and twenty-fourth sections of the tariff act of 1842 are in force, and gives the Treasury construction of them:

"This construction (I quote his circular) of the Department must be binding upon all who perform any duties under these laws, from whatever source their appointment or authority may be derived; and *from such decision there can be no appeal*, except to the judicial powers. (Merchant appraisers—appraisers selected by the collector—were claiming their right to construe the law for themselves, independent of the circular.) The Department, notwithstanding the broad language and comprehensive authority conferred upon it by Congress, feels bound to adopt the construction of the revenue laws, pronounced in solemn adjudications by the Supreme Court of the United States."

(The merchant appraisers were hushed at a blow!)

Mr. Walker goes on to say, treating of the right claimed to estimate the market value of goods at the place or time of purchase:

"The most enormous frauds would be the consequence of such construction. Simulated, fictitious, and antedated purchases to suit the period of lowest prices, would prevail extensively, to the great injury of the fair trader and of the revenue. In truth, under such system, the whole importing business would soon be thrown into the hands of the dishonest and fraudulent, who would be willing to produce antedated or fictitious foreign sales, and that most useful and meritorious citizen, the honest and fair trader, would be thrown entirely out of the market. It is known at present—at the commencement of this proposed system—that even where the purchasers are not deemed by the parties fraudulent, the person designing to import into the United States goes to some prior purchaser, who has purchased, not for importation into the United States, at some prior date when the goods were much lower in value, and imports the goods in the name of the first purchaser, consenting to give a certain profit or price on the delivery here, and thus deprives the revenue of the difference in value, and obtains a most unjust advantage over the fair trader, who will resort to no such artifices. It is the duty of this Department to declare that such a practice is a fraud upon the revenue, and subjects the goods to seizure and confiscation, and the parties committing the fraud to all the penalties prescribed by law; and the utmost vigilance is enjoined upon collectors, appraisers, and all other officers of the customs, in taking all proper measures to detect and punish all who are engaged in such fraudulent practices."

This circular the Secretary followed up by another, August 7, 1848, in which he says:

"Forced sales of goods in the foreign market at reduced prices under extraordinary and peculiar circumstances, cannot be taken as the true market value of such goods. When trade is paralyzed by revolution, and sacrifices of goods take place, sales then made, not being characterized by the ordinary free and healthy state of trade, do not, it is conceived, form proper data for the establishment of an 'actual' market value' in contemplation of law."

There is sense and sound reason in all this; but it was, as will be seen in the end, in violation of law. The dangers to the revenue from changing all specific duties into universal *ad valorems*, brought out yet another circular, December 26, 1848, in which the Secretary says:

"The intent of the 17th section of the act of 30th of August, 1842, in the appointment of merchant appraisers, is evidently to give the merchants an opportunity to appeal from one class of appraisers to another. But it is clear that Congress did not design to relinquish the power in the Government to select the merchant appraisers to whom the case might be referred, nor to give the parties appealing any more voice in the selection of such appraisers than of any other Government officers. *To consult the parties concerned, or allow them a voice in the selection of merchant appraisers*, would soon result in permitting the importers to control the appraisement of their own goods, and it is presumed is not permitted at any port. Merchant appraisers should be particularly instructed, that when acting in that capacity, they are to be governed by the same rules and regulations as provided by law for the direction of regular appraisers, and are to act upon the principle *that the invoice price, or even the price actually paid for an article of merchandise, is by no means a true criterion of the fair market value as prescribed by law*. Adopt a contrary principle, and one who is so fortunate as to have a quantity of merchandise given him, would be entitled to receive it free of duty, or at a nominal duty, if purchased at nominal prices, and different rates would often be assessed by appraisers on articles of the same value. The fair market value intended by law, is the general or ruling price of the article 'in the principal markets of the country from which the same shall have been imported.'"

The Secretaries of the Treasury who followed Mr. Walker necessarily followed the principles of construction he had established in his circulars and the precedents, until they were overruled by the

courts; and, among them all, they piled circular upon circular, Pelion upon Ossa, till an indignant community appealed from the high court of the Treasury to the higher federal courts of judicature. The principles of collecting duties enacted by these Treasury circulars, and all in violation of law, as subsequently decided, were:

1st. That the value of goods at the time and place of shipment to the United States were to be the *ad valorem*, on which duties were to be collected at the American custom-houses.

2d. That the Treasury circulars were binding and conclusive upon collectors and all classes of appraisers—merchant as well as Government appraisers—and that the Government had power in removing as well as in selecting merchant appraisers.

These Treasury circulars thus established a tariff of their own, known under no act of Congress, and as soon as they were tested in the federal court, the federal court swept them away at once. The Whigs contended, and contended truly, that the tariff acts of 1846, as they have passed, left the whole revenue of the Government a prey to foreign fraud, or foreign caprice, or foreign invoices, subject to all sort of foreign fluctuation of value. The Whigs contended that under such a tariff there could be no adequate revenue. The Whigs contended, that to allow foreign manufacturers to fix the market values of all dutiable (American imported) manufactures, at their own door, by their own workshops, was not only wrongful, and subversive of all true principles of a tariff, or sound political economy, but in utter violation of the Constitution of the United States, which requires that "all duties shall be uniform throughout the United States." The keen eye of Mr. Walker saw all this; and hence in the civil and diplomatic bill (August 10, 1848) he obtained, as he thought, new powers for Treasury constructions; and hence his great effort, under the tariff act of 1842, to make his construction and instructions "conclusive and binding." It is impossible to say, even to guess, how much of additional duties he gained to the Government by these illegal circulars; but it is enough to show, by his own Treasury confessions, that without such circulars, under the tariff of 1846, "enormous frauds, simulated, fictitious and antedated purchases" would have prevailed; and, "under such a system, the whole importing business would soon be (have been) thrown into the hands of the dishonest and fraudulent."

NULLIFIED TREASURY CIRCULARS.

These Treasury circulars run on, and were acted upon as law, from December, 1846, till January, 1851, when the Supreme Court of the United States nullified the great body of them, and pronounced them void, and without law. The revenue, nevertheless—the revenue boasted of as so large, but made so large only by lawless circulars—was collected under them for three years and over. Judge Woodbury, sitting in a case in Boston, (Greely *vs.* Thompson and Johnson,) first overruled these circulars. He decided:

1. That the date of the *procurement* of a cargo of iron in Newport, Wales, to wit, the 24th of January, 1849, was the time at which the appraisers should have fixed the value of the iron, and not the date of invoice or bill of lading, the 24th of February; (the price had materially advanced during the previous thirty days, and the jury assessed damages against the collector in the sum $6,681 28, as illegally exacted.)

A like case was made in New York. N. L. & G. Griswold sued the collector for excess of duties upon plantain bark, or hemp and sugar, imported from Manilla, the collector exacting duties upon the market value at the time of shipment, and the plaintiffs paying under protest, contending that the law only compelled them to pay duties upon the market value at the time of purchase. The jury, under the instructions of Judge Nelson, gave a verdict to the plaintiff of $3,206 44, (difference,) and the verdict was affirmed, on appeal, by the Supreme Court in Washington.

These two cases, the pioneers of others now pressing, not only nullified the Treasury rescripts, and broke down the Treasury code, but they exposed the revenue to all the fatal consequences that Mr. Walker had set forth in his circulars, and realized at once the prediction of such men as George Evans and others, that under such a tariff the Government could not be carried on. These decisions were made known immediately to the Treasury Department, to the Ways and Means Committee of the House, and to the Finance Committee of the Senate, and they inspired all with alarm. A double alarm was felt. First, it was asked, what are we to do for revenue? and next, how are we to get rid of paying back the enormous sums in illegal duties we have been over four years exacting under these illegal Treasury circulars? An honorable Senator from Virginia, (Mr. HUNTER,) the chairman of the Finance Committee, a gentleman, I am happy to see, whose views are extending beyond the Blue Ridge and tide-water, immediately brought the whole difficulty and danger before the Senate. He introduced a bill which, March 3, 1851, became a law, and which really and substantially revolutionized the old tariffs, in re-enacting the Treasury circulars, and providing stronger guards and greater securities than ever against under-valuations, false invoices, unequal duties, &c. Mr. HUNTER, in introducing his bill, said:

"The result will be, that hereafter, unless we legislate in relation to the subject, the foreign value of goods will be computed at the time of the procurement or purchase, or at the place of purchase and time of importation, and not at the time and place of importation, as has been heretofore done, and is now proposed. *This would give rise to a great inequality, and open a door, perhaps a very wide door, to fraud.* All men experienced in regard to this matter testify alike. All the Secretaries of the Treasury—Mr. Walker, Mr. Meredith, Mr. Corwin—were of the same opinion in regard to the mode in which the foreign value should be computed. And when we come to look at the effect of substituting the value at the time and place of purchase, for that time and place which this bill proposes, and Mr. Walker's circular required, we find that it throws open a very wide door to fraud, and is calculated to drive the importing business into the hands of foreign merchants; thus discriminating in favor of foreign and against our own importers."

The tariff law of 1846, we thus see, as expounded by the court, left the whole revenue system subject to "great inequality," and "to fraud," and was calculated "to drive the importing business into the hands of foreign merchants," "discriminating against our own."

Mr. HUNTER continues—and I cite his authority, because his condemnation of the principles upon which the tariff act of 1846 left the revenue to be collected will have greater weight than any thing I could say:

"If you adopt the principle laid down by the Supreme Court, the same ship might bring a cargo from the same place and deliver it at the same port. But one part of this cargo having been purchased when the vessel sailed, and the other before, say thirty days, as was done with the iron in the case of Thompson and Forman, and the same ar-

ticle purchased at different times, but delivered at the same moment, would be subject to different rates of duty. This would not only produce a great inequality between man and man, but would often afford an opportunity and temptation for fraud, and make it very difficult for the appraisers to ascertain what was the precise value of these goods at the time designated by law for their estimation. Let us take, by way of illustration, the case of port wine in the warehouses of London. Wine may have been kept there improving, and, after having been kept two or three years, the importer, according to this decision, would have to pay duty for it according to its value at the time of purchase when it was new; and thus, although he sold the old article, he would have a great advantage over another importer, who bought the article out of the warehouse and paid for it the value at the time of importation.

"Again: If we were to adopt such a principle of valuation as this, the manufacturer would, in very many instances, have the advantage in carrying on the import trade with our own country, and would probably possess himself of the largest share; for such a mode of valuation would discriminate in his favor. The manufacturer who has a great quantity of goods on hand, and can wait, when the market is glutted, until they rise in value, according to this decision, could send them over here and pay duty for them according to their value at the time of procurement, or by a fictitious sale transfer them to some consignee, or man of straw, at a date when prices were lower. He would thus have an advantage over the American importer, which would, to a great extent, throw the business of importation into his hands."

TARIFF ACT, MARCH, 1851.

It is almost impossible to describe in stronger terms the vicious principles of revenue in the tariff act, which were left to us by the Congress of 1846. They justify every prediction, every announcement of the Whigs of that day, and when enforced by the decisions of the Supreme Court, Congress immediately proceeded to correct them; and without the act of March 3, 1851, a sufficient revenue could not have been collected. The new tariff act of March 3, 1851, provides that—

"The actual market value, or wholesale price, at the *period of exportation* to the United States in the principal markets of the country," (of export:)

Shall be the real market value on which the duty shall be levied in the United States custom-house, to which shall be added—

"All *costs* and *charges*, except insurance, and *including, in every case, a charge for commissions*, at the usual rates, as the true value at the port where the same may be entered, upon which the duties shall be assessed."

This new tariff act gave the force of law to the nullified Treasury circulars; nay, went further in subsequent sections, by creating four travelling appraisers to go from port to port, to secure, as far as possible, an uniformity of duties in the ports from Eastport, Maine, to Puget's Sound, in Oregon. The act of 1851 is what the lawyers call a Congressional *cognovit*, to all the indictments of George Evans and others, in the Congress of 1846. Under the old Treasury circulars, issued against law, and under this law alone, has the tariff of 1846 been able to yield revenue enough to carry on the Government and to meet the public debt. The Treasury circulars, however, have bequeathed to the country hosts of lawsuits, fifty, it is said, in New York alone, still undecided—such as that of Thompson *vs.* Collector of Boston, and Griswold *vs.* Collector of New York, with business encumbering the federal courts, and running up the already too great expenses of the federal judiciary, and with hosts of demands for refunding duties, the amount of which can be seen by glancing at the record and estimates of the Register of the Treasury. I see at one hasty glance now $439,588 in "repayment of duties on sugar and molasses illegally exacted by collectors, refunded under a decree of the courts, acquiesced in by the Treasury Department;" and these, among other such items, now swell up the apparent expenditures of this Government!

But, say gentlemen on the other side, "if the tariff of 1846, or what you now call the tariff of 1851, yields revenue enough, and is high enough, why demand any change in such a tariff? Why complain of it?" I have anticipated such a question, and I am prepared to answer it now.

THE VICE OF THE SYSTEM.

The essential, radical, incurable defect of the tariffs of 1846 and 1851 is the universal *ad valorems*, and the *principle* of them, that establishes the duty to be levied, upon the ever-fluctuating, ever-uncertain foreign valuation. It is wrong, radically wrong, that foreign nations should, in foreign invoices, make a universal American tariff. And it is a wrong that no stiff, stern legislation, no violent Treasury circulars, no travelling appraisers, can ever cure. The tariff of 1851 has followed the foreign invoice down to the place of export, and affixed to it there all costs, and charges, and commissions—so far, well; but levying a duty upon a Manilla, a London, or a Marseilles invoice, in a New York custom house, is, to a great extent, collecting American duties upon a foreign tariff, in Manilla, London, or Marseilles. It is impossible to inspire confidence in these foreign invoices. It is impossible to make an American merchant believe that he is doing business on fair and equal terms with the London born, the Manilla born, and the Marseilles born merchant. It is impossible to know for a certainty in New York whether or not the invoice is a real *bona fide* invoice, or if so, whether or not it may not be under, or above, the general, actual, or real value of the goods in the country of the export. It is impossible to find appraisers that know every country, every production, every process of manufacture, every price of every thing, everywhere; and hence there is a constant collision between merchant and appraiser, between the Treasury Department and the business of the country. To make themselves universal geniuses, or to qualify themselves to presume to know every thing everywhere, I venture to say you will find scarcely an appraiser who does not study a foreign price-current more than he studies the tariff statutes of his own land; and I am sure you will find Wilmer's *European Times*, with its numerous prices-current, (and not always correct ones,) hung up in every appraiser's office, from the commissioner of the customs here in Washington eastward to Eastport, and westward to San Francisco. Wilmer's *European Times* is thus practically the American revenue law of the land; and the foreigner, who wants to amend the American statute to suit him, will resort to amending the prices-current sent from Liverpool to New York. "Why quit our own, I ask, to stand on foreign ground?" No other nation does so. The British revised tariff of 1846, which has so often been commended to us for imitation, collects only £38,000 ($182,000) per annum in a gross receipt for customs of £22,000,000 ($105,000,000) for articles paying *ad valorem* duties, being less than one-fifth of one per cent. of this immense income from imports! All Europe pursues a similar course.

The errors or frauds that do arise, and must arise, from subjecting all the productions of the earth to universal, horizontal *ad valorems*, cannot be got over or got under, however much the attempt may be made to avoid the facts that have been marshalled in proof of the allegation. The Secretary of the Treasury, in his report of December, 1850, exhibits irresistibly conclusive proof in demonstration of them. He shows that prior to the act of March, 1851, in New York and Boston alone, the appraisers advanced on the invoices, from Jan., 1849, to October 1, 1850, $4,098 in number, thus:

Whole number of advances in New York	2,359
Whole number of advances in Boston	1,739
	4,098

He shows, too, that in an importation of fruit (oranges) shipped by the same house, from St. Michaels to Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, at Philadelphia they passed at the invoice value; at New York the appraisers advanced it 75 per cent., and at Boston 92 per cent., and no objection or appeal was made by the importers. A like extraordinary pimento case from the Island of Jamaica is set forth. Indeed, I might, with a little research, go on and add an indefinite number of like cases—but why prove appraisers are men, and that their judgments must vary—and that thus there must be a very unequal system of duties in the widespread ports of this now vast Republic of States?

But what is more ruinous to the commerce and industry of the country than all these vicious principles of universal *ad valorems*, is the ever-fluctuating basis of these foreign valuations upon which our commerce and all our manufacturing industry are obliged to stand. As well stand man and labor, it seems to me, upon the rolling billows of the sea, in some frail barque, without chart or rudder, as stand man and labor upon ever fluctuating foreign valuations in foreign ports. The sliding corn laws of Great Britain have been, throughout the world, universally condemned as defective in equity and sound principles of political economy; but here is a sliding scale of duties in our country, based upon no home-made laws, but upon foreign invoices, foreign valuations, which, as they go up or down in Europe, go up or down in America. These sliding scales operate never favorably, as the British corn laws did; that is, reduring duties when imports rise in price, but just the reverse; for when exports rise in price in Liverpool or London, duties rise in rates in New York; and the very moment the import should be made as cheap as possible to the consumer, from its rise in price abroad, that very moment it is made dearer to the consumer by additional duties at home. No duties at all are better protection to labor at home than such ever-fluctuating, sliding protection; for then labor hopes for nothing, expects nothing, risks nothing, invests nothing. Iron, for illustration, was, under the sufficiently-protective *ad valorem* prices of the tariff of July and August, 1846, tempted to hope on, to expect, to risk more rather than to invest less; but as prices went down in England and Wales, these tariff duties of 1846 went down lower and lower here, until there is danger that the leading iron interests of the country will be annihilated, and that for this great necessary of life we become altogether subject to foreign nations—their power, and their caprice. If iron ever rises in price abroad above the high prices of 1846, the consumer will have to pay higher duties under such an *ad valorem* tariff, than he paid under the tariff of 1842; so that when this great necessary of life may be most needed by the consumer here, to be got at the cheapest rate, higher duties at home come in and add themselves to higher prices abroad. Our tariff system now is one of high duties at home on high prices abroad, and of low duties at home on low prices abroad. The first is ruinous to the consumer; the second ruinous to the home producer.

The tariff of 1846, carried out by the tariff of 1851, yields revenue enough, and, in my opinion, more than enough. The country, under it, is taxed as much as it ought to be, and more too. The indictment I bring against the existing tariff is, that it discriminates against American interests, American industry, American labor, American merchants—seldom or never in their behalf. One count in that indictment is, that it exacts unnecessary duties upon raw materials coming into competition with nothing American, and often an equal or higher rate of duty on the raw material than upon the manufactured article of which it is composed. Another count in that indictment is the fact that these invariable, universal, horizontal *ad valorems* tempt to excessive importations beyond our means to pay, or to great fluctuations. When foreign products are low, duties here are low; when higher duties would be better for the country, and when foreign products are high, duties here are high; so that when we least want foreign goods, from their excessive abundance, we have the most of them; and, when we most want them, we have to pay the most for them. The whole system thus becomes vicious from beginning to end—vicious not only to industry and labor at home, but vicious to commerce, vicious to the currency, vicious to exchanges, both foreign and domestic, and constantly involving individuals in alternate speculations and bankruptcies. Under it, we Americans are taxing ourselves to carry on our own Government as the capitalists, and the wages of labor in great manufacturing marts, such as Manchester, Birmingham, and Lyons, may dictate. The tariff, as a whole, I repeat, is, in the main, high enough, and the tariff of 1846, as it was passed, under the then existing high *ad valorems*, was, in most articles, (if duties could have been enforced upon honest *ad valorems*,) well enough; but the vicious principle upon which it is based will never be acquiesced in by an intelligent, industrious people.

REVENUE FROM TEXAS AND THE PACIFIC.

These are some of the reasons why so many of the people of this country demand a revision of the existing tariff, a reduction or abolition of duties upon some articles, and a modification of others. But before I can thoroughly answer the question, why the existing tariff has yielded so much revenue, I must again ask attention to the growth, prosperity, and increase of the country since 1846. Texas, at that time, was not in a condition of sufficient security to yield us any revenue. Indeed, the now chief importing point in it, Point Isabel, was then practically, if not theoretically, under the Mexican government. The duties collected at Point Isabel—

From July 1, '49, to June 30, '50, were	$5,509 73
From July 1, '50, to June 30, 51, were	4,321 78
From July 1, '51, to June 30, 52, were	100,561 80
Total	$147,393 31

This is one port in Texas alone, beyond United States jurisdiction in 1846—but Texas importations are made chiefly in New York or New Orleans; and no table, therefore, can be prepared to show how much of our revenue Texas pays.

The whole Pacific coast has been added to us since 1846, with the people of New Mexico, and others. San Francisco has now become the fourth

or fifth importing city in the Union—being equal to, if even behind, New Orleans. I have a table before me which shows the receipts from customs, on account of duties on merchandise, tonnage, light-money, and marine-hospital money in California and Oregon, to be in all, from November 12, 1849, to December, 1851, $4,238,434. The details may be interesting:

San Francisco—12th November to 31st December, 1849	$216,452 82
San Francisco—12th November to 31st December, 1850	1,750,646 86
San Francisco—12th November to 31st December, 1851	2,146,791 58
	$4,113,891 29
Sonoma—10th January to 30th June, 1851	$12,917 15
San Joaquin—25th July, 1851, to 31st January, 1852	231 19
Sacramento—7th May to 31st December, 1851	1,772 48
San Diego—13th January to 30th of September, 1851	9,491 28
Monterey—7th March to 30th September, 1851	6,829 46
Oregon—3d April, 1849, to 30th September, 1851	93,301 76
	$4,238,434 58

These are some of the causes which have swollen the importations, and consequently the receipts from customs, (June 30, 1851,) up to $49,017,567. If they have gone beyond the expectations of the Whigs in 1846, it was because the tariff of 1846 had an unlawful substitute found for it in the Treasury circulars of Mr. Walker, and because of the great and unexpected increase of the country geographically. Under all circumstances, as we grow numerically or geographically, we must buy more from abroad, and consume more at home, always provided we can have the means for purchase.

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